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We propose and implement a framework for characterizing and monitoring the global business cycle.
Our framework utilizes high-frequency data, allows us to account for a potentially large amount of
missing observations, and is designed to facilitate the updating of global activity estimates as data
are released and revisions become available. We apply the framework to the G-7 countries and study
various aspects of national and global business cycles, obtaining three main results. First, our measure
of the global business cycle, the common G-7 real activity factor, explains a significant amount of
cross-country variation and tracks  the major global cyclical events of the past forty years. Second,
the common G-7 factor and the idiosyncratic country factors play different roles at different times
in shaping national economic activity. Finally, the degree of G-7 business cycle synchronization among
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In the modern environment of radically enhanced global macroeconomic and nancial link-
ages, isolated country analysis seems highly insucient for informed assessment of the state
of real activity, and hence for informed decision making. Hence we propose and implement
a framework for characterizing and monitoring the global business cycle. Our framework
is informed by economic theory and structured so as to help inform subsequent economic
theory. We apply it to the G-7 countries, and in so doing we extend the empirical research
program on the global business cycle along several dimensions.
First, we consider the roles played by a large set of macroeconomic indicators when we
construct our country and global cycles. The country and global factors that we estimate
provide a better characterization of business cycles as they encompass a wide array of activity
measures, in the tradition of Burns and Mitchell (1946) and much subsequent research. This
contrasts with most of the literature on global business cycles, which uses only quarterly
national income and product account data.
Second, our comparatively comprehensive set of indicators enables us to provide a sys-
tematic characterization of global and national business cycles. In particular, we analyze
various statistical properties of cycles, and we relate certain cyclical episodes to the move-
ments in country and global macroeconomic factors. We also study the interaction of activity
across countries and with the global cycle.
Third, and related, we use our rich set of indicators to explore the evolution of the global
business cycle. We emphasize, among other things, whether and how cross-country business
cycle synchronization has evolved in response to the forces of globalization. Against this
background, we devote special attention to the recent recession.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we review several literatures that bear on our
concerns. We rst provide a summary of various empirical approaches used to model the
global business cycle. Then, considering that our measures of global and national business
cycles should help us analyze the evolution of business cycle synchronization, we also review
the literature on linkages between globalization and synchronization. The main message is
that, although various approaches have been employed, it has been a challenge to construct
practical and satisfactory tools for monitoring global business cycles.
In Section 3 we construct and examine a new G-7 dataset, which contains a variety of
real activity indicators. In particular, we use six widely-followed real activity indicators for
each country whenever available: employment, GDP, disposable income, industrial produc-
tion, retail sales, and initial claims for unemployment insurance. Because the indicators
1are available at dierent frequencies and dates, they provide valuable and complementary
high-frequency information about the state of the economy.
In Section 4 we introduce and t a simple dynamic factor model for real activity separately
for each country. We work in a state space framework with multiple indicators and a single
latent activity factor, which we extract optimally using the Kalman lter. One distinguishing
feature of our approach is that we are able to utilize mixed-frequency data, specifying the
model at high frequency and allowing for a potentially large amount of missing data (for the
less-frequently observed variables). The country factors that we extract explain most of the
common variation in underlying country activity indicators, and they are consistent with a
number of well-known business-cycle episodes in each country. Moreover, we nd that the
degree of country-factor synchronization has changed over time in response to growing global
linkages, which change the importance of common vs. country-specic shocks.
In Section 5 we estimate a hierarchical multi-country model. After obtaining the esti-
mated country factors, we decompose their movements into those coming from a common
G-7 factor and those coming from idiosyncratic components. The G-7 factor measures the
global business cycle, capturing common uctuations in country factors, which are them-
selves reections of common movements in underlying activity variables in each country.
The G-7 factor captures a signicant amount of common variation across countries and re-
ects the major cyclical events of the past forty years. Moreover, it appears to play dierent
roles at dierent times in shaping national economic activity. We conclude in Section 6.
2 An Interpretive Literature Review
Here we present a brief and selective survey of empirical strategies used to model the global
business cycle as relevant for our subsequent development, examining how those strategies
have evolved in academic and policy circles over the years. We pay special attention to the
links, both theoretical and empirical, between globalization and business-cycle synchroniza-
tion.
2.1 Empirical Modeling of the Global Business Cycle
As global linkages have become stronger, the interest in understanding the dynamics of global
activity has increased in both academic and policy circles. Many studies use simple measures
of global activity, which are often based on a country size weighted average of the major
advanced countries' output growth (see Ahmed et al. (1993)). More recently, developments
2of new econometric methods and advances in computing technology have facilitated the use
of more sophisticated approaches, such as dynamic factor models.1 These models have been
quite successful in capturing common uctuations in multiple time-series of a large cross-
section of countries. Some of these models rely on a single measure of aggregate activity,
such as output, while others employ multiple indicators, including output, consumption and
investment, in order to provide more reliable estimates of global business cycles (see Gregory
et al. (1997); Kose et al. (2003a); Kose et al. (2003b); and Kose et al. (2008b)).2 As we
present later in this section, these models have been widely used to study the evolution of
global business cycles.
In policy circles as well, there has been an increasing appreciation of the importance of
well-designed tools to track global economic activity. Approaches employed by policy institu-
tions dier considerably in technical sophistication and scope. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF), for example, uses a simple country size weighted average of each member coun-
try's output growth rate to arrive at its estimate of the world output growth.3 Given that
the IMF membership includes a rather diverse set of 187 countries, the measure it employs
provides a simple and intuitive characterization of global economic activity. However, the
measure has also some drawbacks. First, GDP is often available only at quarterly frequency
making it dicult to monitor global activity at higher frequencies. Second, as much as it
is a simple and intuitive measure, it is based on a single indicator, GDP, which is a rather
crude measure of activity with a variety of well-known shortcomings.
In addition to the simple measures mentioned above, applications of various composite,
leading, and coincident indicators have been employed to assess the state of activity in a
(functional/regional) group of countries. Well-known examples of these include the OECD's
composite leading indicators and the CEPR's EuroCOIN. Both indicators are available in
monthly frequency and employ a large number of activity variables. The OECD's composite
leading indicators use various weighting and ltering methods to aggregate information from
the underlying activity variables.4 The indicators are intended to provide early signals of
1One of the earliest contributions to this literature is Stock and Watson (1989) who employ a dynamic
factor model to develop a composite index of coincident indicators for the United States.
2Some other studies focus on models to derive the likelihood of the phases of global business cycle using
dynamic factor models combined with Markov switching methods (see Chauvet and Yu (2006)).
3To be more specic, the IMF uses weights that correspond to GDP valued at purchasing power parity
(PPP) as a share of total world GDP (see IMF (April 2010).
4The OECD methodology closely follows the techniques developed by the NBER. Burns and Mitchell
(1946) and Moore and Shiskin (1967) put together the very early versions of the composite indexes of leading,
coincident, and lagging indicators of economic activity. The Conference Board uses the same framework to
produce its various indexes of U.S. economic activity.
3turning points in business cycles of various groups of countries, including the OECD area,
euro area, Major Five Asia, and G-7. However, like most other composite indexes of activity,
the OECD's indexes also lack a well-dened econometric methodology and involve a rather
subjective determination of the underlying economic variables and their aggregation.
The CEPR's EuroCOIN is a coincident indicator designed to monitor euro area activity in
real time. The index is estimated using a Generalized Dynamic Factor Model (see Altissimo
et al. (2001)). Using a sizable number of data series, including measures of real and nancial
sectors activity and surveys of business and consumer sentiment, the indicator provides an
estimate of the monthly growth of Euro area GDP.
As the discussion so far has shown, although various approaches have been employed,
it has been a challenge to construct practical and satisfactory tools to monitor global busi-
ness cycles. The methodology we use in this paper has several advantages over existing
approaches. First, our framework is useful for monitoring global economic activity in real-
time. Second, our measure of global business cycles captures common movements in a wide
range of indicators, such as GDP, income, retail sales, initial claims, employment, and in-
dustrial production. We combine the information content of activity measures available at
dierent frequencies (monthly as well as quarterly) to arrive at a monthly measure. Third,
our measure of global activity is obtained using linear and exact procedures that are easily
reproducible. Fourth, our methodology leads to a coherent analysis of interactions between
the global business cycle and country-specic cycles as it employs a well-dened hierarchical
structure to estimate these cycles.
2.2 Globalization and Business Cycle Synchronization
A large literature examines the implications of globalization, which is often associated with
increased international trade and nancial linkages, for the synchronization of international
business cycles.
2.2.1 Theory
Economic theory has ambiguous predictions about the impact of increased trade and -
nancial linkages on the comovement amongst macroeconomic aggregates across countries.
Stronger trade linkages can lead to higher or lower degree of comovement depending on the
nature of integration and the form of specialization patterns. International trade linkages
generate both demand and supply-side spillovers across countries, which can increase the
4degree of business cycle synchronization. For example, on the demand side, an investment
or consumption boom in one country can generate increased demand for imports, boosting
economies abroad. On the supply-side, a positive tradable output shock leads to lower prices;
hence, imported inputs for other countries become cheaper. Through these types of spillover
eects, stronger international trade linkages can result in more highly correlated business
cycles across countries.
However, both classical and \new" trade theories imply that increased openness (trade
linkages) to trade leads to increased specialization. How does increased specialization aect
the degree of synchronization? The answer depends on the nature of specialization (intra-
vs. inter-industry) and the types of shocks (common vs. country-specic). If stronger trade
linkages are associated with increased inter-industry specialization across countries, then the
impact of increased trade depends on the nature of shocks: If industry-specic shocks are
more important in driving business cycles, then international business cycle comovement is
expected to decrease. If common shocks, which might be associated with changes in demand
and/or supply conditions, are more dominant than industry specic shocks, then this would
lead to a higher degree of business cycle comovement.
What about the impact of nancial integration on the extent of business cycle comove-
ment? Analytically, the eects of nancial integration also depend on the nature of shocks
and the form of specialization patterns. For example, nancial linkages could result in a
higher degree of business cycle synchronization by generating large demand side eects as
the changes in equity prices aect the dynamics of wealth. If consumers from dierent coun-
tries have a signicant fraction of their investments in a particular stock market, then a
decline in that stock market could induce a simultaneous decline in the demand for con-
sumption and investment goods in these countries because of its impact on domestic wealth.
Furthermore, contagion eects that are transmitted through nancial linkages could also
result in heightened cross-country spillovers of macroeconomic uctuations.
However, international nancial linkages could decrease the cross-country output corre-
lations as they stimulate specialization of production through the reallocation of capital in
a manner consistent with countries' comparative advantage in the production of dierent
goods. For example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) nd that there is a signicant positive
correlation between the degree of nancial integration (risk sharing) and specialization of
production. In other words, through increasing nancial linkages countries can have a more
diversied portfolio and are able to insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks. This
would lead to less correlated cross-country uctuations in output as it could result in more
5exposure to industry- or country-specic shocks. However, since such specialization of pro-
duction would typically be expected to be accompanied by the use of international nancial
markets to diversify consumption risk, it should result in stronger comovement of consump-
tion across countries.
Increased integration could also aect the dynamics of comovement by changing the
nature and frequency of shocks. First, as trade and nancial linkages get stronger, the need
for a higher degree of policy coordination might increase, which, in turn, raise the correlations
between shocks associated with nation specic scal and/or monetary policies. This would
naturally have a positive impact on the degree of business cycle synchronization. However,
it is not clear, at least in theory, whether increasing trade and nancial linkages indeed lead
to a growing need for the implementation of coordinated policies. Traditional arguments,
based on trade multiplier models, would suggest that increased linkages implies a growing
need for international policy coordination (see Oudiz and Sachs (1984)). However, recent
research by Obstfeld and Rogo (2003) provides results quite dierent than those in the
previous literature. They argue that integration may in fact diminish the need for policy
coordination since international capital markets generate an expanded set of opportunities
for cross-country risk sharing.
Second, shocks pertaining to changes in productivity could become more correlated, if
increased trade and nancial integration leads to an acceleration in knowledge and produc-
tivity spillovers across countries (see Coe and Helpman (1995)). More nancially integrated
economies are able to attract relatively large foreign direct investment ows which have the
potential to generate productivity spillovers.
Third, increased nancial integration and developments in communication technologies
lead to faster dissemination of news shocks in nancial markets. This could have a positive
impact on the degree of business cycle synchronization if, for example, good news about
the future of domestic economy would increase domestic consumption through its impact
on wealth, and, if consumers in other countries, who hold stocks in the domestic country,
raise demand for goods in their countries. In other words, shocks associated with news,
which are rapidly transmitted in global nancial markets, could lead to a higher degree of
interdependence across economic activity in dierent countries.
2.2.2 Empirics
Empirical studies are also unable to provide a concrete explanation for the impact of stronger
trade and nancial linkages on the nature of business cycles. There has been a growing re-
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dynamics of business cycle comovement using a variety of methods. A widely popular ap-
proach in this literature involves with the study of the changes in some simple measures of
business cycle comovement over time. Another strand of the literature directly examines
how increasing trade and nancial linkages aect the business cycle correlations employing
various regression models. A third approach uses recently developed econometric methods,
such as dynamic factor models, to examine the characteristics of common factors in business
cycles.
The studies in the rst group focus on the evolution of comovement properties of the
main macroeconomic aggregates over time in response to changes in the volume of trade and
nancial ows. The results of these studies indicate that dierences in country coverage,
sample periods, aggregation methods used to create country groups, and econometric meth-
ods employed could lead to diverse conclusions about the temporal evolution of business
cycle synchronization. For example, some of these studies nd evidence of declining output
correlations among industrial economies over the last three decades. Helbling and Bayoumi
(2003) nd that correlation coecients between the United States and other G-7 countries
for the period 1973-2001 are substantially lower than those for 1973-1989. In a related pa-
per, Heathcote and Perri (2004) document that the correlations of output, consumption, and
investment between the U.S. and an aggregate of Europe, Canada, and Japan are lower in
the period 1986-2000 than in 1972-1985. Results by Doyle and Faust (2005) indicate that
there is no signicant change in the correlations between the growth rate of output in the
United States and in other G-7 countries over time.
The empirical studies in the second group employ cross-country or cross-region panel re-
gressions to assess the role of global linkages on the comovement properties of business cycles
in developed and developing countries. While Imbs (2004) and Imbs (2006) nd that the ex-
tent of nancial linkages, sectoral similarity, and the volume of intra-industry trade all have
a positive impact on business cycle correlations, Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and Otto
et al. (2001) document that international trade is the most important transmission channel
of business cycles. The results by Kose et al. (2003b) suggest that both trade and nan-
cial linkages have a positive impact on cross-country output and consumption correlations.
Calderon et al. (2007) report that international trade linkages lead to higher cross-country
business cycle correlations among developed countries than developing countries.
Some other studies employ factor models to study the changes in the degree of business
cycle comovement, but those studies also report conicting ndings. Stock and Watson
7(2005) employ a factor-structural VAR model to analyze the importance of international
factors in explaining business cycles in the G-7 countries since 1960. They conclude that
comovement has fallen in the 1984-2002 period relative to 1960-1983 due to diminished
importance of common shocks. Kose et al. (2008b) employ a Bayesian dynamic factor model
to analyze the evolution of comovement since 1960.5 Using the data of the G-7 countries,
they document that the common (G-7) factor on average explains a larger fraction of output,
consumption, and investment volatility in the globalization period (1986-2005) than that
in the 1960-1972 period. They interpret this result as an indication of increasing degree
of business cycle synchronization in the age of globalization. Kose et al. (2008a) employ
a dynamic factor model to analyze the evolution of synchronization in a large sample of
industrial, emerging and developing countries. They report that since the mid-1980s there
has been a higher degree of synchronization of business cycle uctuations among the group
of industrial economies and among the group of emerging market economies.
3 A G-7 Real Activity Indicator Dataset
We work with a G-7 dataset. Although the G-7 is a smaller group of countries than we
ultimately hope to incorporate, it is nevertheless highly-signicant and certainly much more
encompassing than the U.S. alone. Indeed the U.S. is responsible for only twenty-ve percent
of world real output at market exchange rates, whereas the G-7 is responsible for fty
percent.6
Partly reecting our desire to maximize transparency and convenience, and partly re-
ecting the paucity of useful and comparable high-frequency real activity indicator data
available for a large group of countries, we adopt a monthly base frequency. This eliminates
many of the complications in Aruoba et al. (2009), including time-varying system matrices,
high-dimensional state vectors, etc.
For each country we use data matching six economic concepts where available: em-
ployment, GDP, disposable income, industrial production, retail sales and initial claims for
unemployment insurance. There are several reasons why we focus on those variables. First,
they constitute an integral part of activity indexes that are used to study the direction of
the economy by policy institutions, think tanks, and nancial markets. While GDP is the
5There is a rich literature on large dynamic factor models (see, e.g., Forni et al. (2000); Forni and Reichlin
(2001), Stock and Watson (2002); Doz et al. (2008)).
6These approximate shares are for 2006-2008; see IMF (April 2010). Eventually we hope to move to
G-20 and beyond. The G-20 covers roughly ninety percent of global economic activity; see www.G20.org.
8most widely followed indicator of aggregate activity, the others move closely with the dif-
ferent phases of the cycle. Initial claims is a leading indicator of business cycle; industrial
production, retails sales, and income are coincident indicators; and employment is a lagging
indicator. Second, the business cycle dating committees, including the NBER Business Cy-
cle Dating Committee and CEPR Business Cycle Dating Committee, base their decisions on
those or closely-related indicators. Third, and related, those variables are the ones used to
produce the ADS Business Conditions Index based on Aruoba et al. (2009) now provided
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, as well as the Conference Board's composite
coincident index, among others. We use the same set of variables here, to the extent possible,
for the other countries.
We gathered all data in April 2010; the resulting sample ranges from 1970 through 2009.
Across the seven countries, we have a total of 37 series observed over (at most) 40 years. The
specic statistical series available sometimes dier across countries, although the economic
concepts measured are highly similar. For example, we use U.S. payroll employment and
Canadian civilian employment. Sources vary, but we rely heavily on the Haver and OECD
databases. We measure all indicators in real terms. We use indicators seasonally adjusted by
the relevant reporting agency.7 We transform all indicators to logarithmic changes, except
initial claims; hence all are ows.
We summarize certain aspects of the data in Table 1, which gives for each country the
series used, the data source, and the data range. We also indicate implicitly in the range the
observational frequency of each indicator; some are monthly (\M") and some are quarterly
(\Q"). The frequency diers not only across series, but sometimes also for the same series
across countries. For example, French employment is measured quarterly, whereas German
employment is measured monthly. Finally, we remove extreme outliers (more than four
standard deviations from the mean) from all series.8
In Figures 1-7 we plot the indicators for each country expressed in annual growth terms,
except for initial claims which is reported as a fraction of the labor force for most countries.
They are quite noisy { month-to-month indicator movements in industrial production and
retail sales, for example, can occasionally be very large when expressed at annual rates. It
is clear that idiosyncratic noise in the individual indicators masks much of the real activity
information contained in them, which is of course the reason for using several indicators for
each country. In what follows we use optimal ltering methods that eectively calculate
7There are two exceptions: Canadian and Japanese initial unemployment claims are reported in season-
ally unadjusted form, so we seasonally adjust the data ourselves using the Census X-12 algorithm.
8This results in deleting a total of 29 observations across all countries and periods.
9sophisticated averages across idiosyncratic indicators, eliminating much of the noise and
producing accurate assessments of underlying real activity.
4 Single-Country Real Activity Modeling
For each country we observe a variety of indicators, all of which contain information about
the latent state of economic activity. Hence, building on earlier work of Stock and Watson
(1989), Mariano and Murasawa (2003), Aruoba et al. (2009) and Aruoba and Diebold (2010),
we work in a state space framework with multiple indicators and a single latent activity
factor, which we extract optimally using the Kalman lter. We allow for mixed-frequency
data, specifying the model at high frequency (in the present case, monthly) and allowing for
a potentially large amount of missing data (for variables that are less-frequently- observed
and/or variables more recently available). In what follows we rst discuss the country factor
model with some precision, and then we present a variety of empirical results, both within
and across countries.
4.1 A Single-Country Dynamic Factor Model
The latent real activity factor xt evolves monthly with covariance-stationary autoregressive
dynamics,
xt = 1xt 1 + ::: + pxt p + t; (1)
where t is a white noise innovation with unit variance. The i-th covariance-stationary daily
indicator ^ yi




























t are white-noise shocks that are uncorrelated with each other and with t. In our imple-
mentation below, we use p = q = 3.
Note that some indicators, although evolving monthly, are not observed monthly. If yi
t
denotes ^ yi
t observed at a possibly lower frequency, then the relationship between yi
t and ^ yi
t
depends on whether ^ yi
t is a stock or ow variable as well as the frequency of observation.
Remember that all of our observed variables are ow variables either because they are orig-
10inally ow variables as in initial claims or because we use their growth rates. For variables
observed every month, we have yi
t = ^ yi
t and (2) is the measurement equation. For variables





















Compiling the components, our framework corresponds to a state space system:
t+1 = Tt + Rut (5)
yt = c + Zt; (6)
for t = 1;:::;T ; where t is a vector of state variables which contains appropriate lags of xt
and "i
t, yt is a vector of observed variables, ut collects the innovations t and vi
t, c collects the
constant terms and T denotes sample size. The innovations ut are distributed according to
ut  (0;Q). In Appendix A we show the exact state space object we use with the associated
matrices.9
Importantly for us, despite the missing data the Kalman lter and associated likelihood
evaluation via prediction-error decomposition remain valid in our environment, subject to
some simple modications. This is well-known, as discussed for example in Durbin and
Koopman (2001) and exploited in Aruoba et al. (2009). The benet of this approach is that
we can use simple modications of the standard Kalman lter and smoother to produce
exact maximum-likelihood estimates of our model, and to produce optimal estimates of its
latent macroeconomic activity factor, xt. We now proceed to do so.
4.2 Single-Country Empirics and Extraction of Country Real Ac-
tivity
In this section, we rst present our estimation results with respect to the country factors and
discuss how they relate to the underlying activity variables. Then, we briey describe the
temporal evolution of the country factors in order to evaluate whether they are consistent
with the well-known historical episodes of business cycles. Next, we analyze the extent of
9To identify the factor model, we normalize the variance of  such that xt has a unit variance. This
requires a non-linear restriction in 1, 2,...,p and the variance of .
11synchronization across factors and the evolution of synchronization over time.
We report three main results in this sub-section. First, the country factors we estimate
capture most of the common variation in underlying activity indicators. Second, they are
able to capture the main macroeconomic developments over the past 40 years as they clearly
feature periods of recessions and expansions that are fairly consistent with the business cycle
narrative of these countries. In particular, they show that the 2008-2009 recession is the
longest and deepest episode in a number of countries. Third, although the extent of co-
movement across countries is quite high over the full sample, it varies over time. While it is
likely that increased globalization of trade and nancial linkages explains some the temporal
movements in the degree of co-movement, changing intensity of common and country-specic
shocks also appears to play an important role.
4.2.1 Country Factors
We estimate our country factors using the measurement equations (6) and transition equa-
tions (5). The estimated measurement equations, reported in Table 2, top panel, reveal that
almost all indicators (34 out of 37) for all countries load positively and signicantly on the
country factors. The only exceptions are initial claims in the U.S. and Canada, as expected
given its counter-cyclical nature { with negative loadings { and in Japan and France { with
statistically insignicant coecients. Disposable income in Italy is not statistically signi-
cant suggesting that this variable is unable to provide useful information to characterize the
Italian business cycles.
The estimated transition equations, Table 2, middle and bottom panels, typically reveal
signicant positive serial correlation in the dynamics of country factors. The extracted fac-
tor is essentially a measure of deviation from the mean growth rate, so it is not necessarily
expected to feature an extremely high serial correlation. The dominant roots of the autore-
gressive lag operator polynomials are smaller than one for all countries, with all but one
country featuring complex roots.
We extract the country factors using the Kalman smoother. The extent of contempora-
neous co-movement between country factors and the underlying indicators of activity varies
across countries (see panel (a) of Table 3). For instance, the co-movement between the
country factors and GDP is quite high, ranging from a low of 0.61 for Germany to a high
of 0.89 for France. In contrast, the co-movement between the country factors and some
other indicators, such as retail sales and income, tends to be relatively low. In Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom, the country factors are also highly correlated
12with both industrial production and employment. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the U.S.
country factor features higher co-movement with these two activity variables than it does
with GDP. In fact, among the six activity indicators, GDP features the highest correlation
with the country factor in all countries except the U.S. Conrming the ndings from the
measurement equations, initial claims are negatively and weakly correlated with the country
factors.
In order to further examine the links between the country factors and underlying activity
variables, we regress each county factor obtained through the Kalman lter on current and
12 lags of standardized activity variables. By construction, the ltered factor is a linear
function of the current and all lagged indicators. By running this regression, we essentially
recover the weights of each indicator at each lag.10 Given the properties of the Kalman lter,
the ltered factor is necessarily a linear function of all current and past observables, implying
that one would theoretically expect an R2 of unity if we had a large enough sample. For
most of the countries, we indeed have very high R2 numbers reecting that these 13 lags are
enough to capture most of the variation for the factors. Since both the left-hand-side and
the right-hand-side variables are such that they have zero mean and unit standard deviation,
the coecients can be compared across activity variables. In panel (b) of Table 3 we report
the coecient of the contemporaneous activity variables and in panel (c) we report the sum
of the coecients for each variable to get its total eect. The results once again emphasize
the tight connection between the country factors and GDP and industrial production. In
particular, GDP appears to be the most important variable in driving country factors in all
cases except the U.S. where industrial production appears to be the most inuential. After
GDP, industrial production tends to be the most relevant one while both income and initial
claims have minor roles in explaining the country factors.
4.2.2 Evolution of Country Factors
How successful are our country factors in capturing the well-known episodes of business
cycles since 1970? This is an important question since we later use these factors to estimate
our global factor that is intended to be used to monitor global economic activity in real-
time. In order to answer this question, we present the estimated country factors in the
top panels of Figures 8-14. We discuss the bottom panels of these gures in Section 5.
10Stock and Watson (1988) do a similar exercise with their coincident indicator. In their case, since all
indicators are monthly and there is no temporal aggregation/missing observation problems, they are able to
obtain these weights directly from the estimated system matrices. In our case, the said problems complicate
matters and these regressions provide a good approximation.
13Note that in the estimation we normalized the variance of each country factor to unity
and the magnitudes of the factors can be interpreted as the distance from the mean (of
zero) in number of standard deviations: for example if the factor is equal to  2, it is 2
standard deviations below the mean, and given the normality assumption, just outside the
95% condence bands around zero. The country factors are generally quite successful in
displaying the main macroeconomic developments in the G-7 countries.11 In particular, the
country factors clearly feature periods of recessions and expansions that are fairly consistent
with the business cycle narrative of each of these countries. Well known recessionary episodes
such as the downturns of the mid-1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, early 2000s, and the latest
wave of recessions in 2008-2009 are clearly captured by the country factors.
Moreover, the country factors are also able replicate the expansionary periods of the late
1970s, mid-1980s, the long-expansion during the 1990s, and the growth acceleration of the
mid-2000s. In particular, several of the peaks and troughs of the U.S. country factor coincide
with the NBER reference cycle dates.12 In addition, the U.S. factor features the growth
accelerations of the early 1970s, 1983-1985, and the mid-1990s. Somewhat surprisingly,
the U.S. country factor suggests that the recessions of 1975 and 1980 are deeper than the
2008-2009 recession, a pattern not observed just by looking at output cycles. A closer
inspection of the underlying data, however, indicates that the adverse eects on employment
and industrial production of the 1975 recession are indeed much more pronounced than those
of the 2008-2009 recession.13
The Japanese country factor displays the evolutionary dynamics of domestic business cy-
cles. In particular, the factor for Japan shows two distinctive decades-the boom decades of
the 1970s and 1980s, during which Japan switched to an information-based export economy,
and the "Lost Decade" of the 1990s, that resulted from the collapse of asset price bubble in
the late 1980s. The well-documented episodes of recessions are also clearly visible. For ex-
ample, Japan is very much aected by the oil shock in the 1970s due to its heavy dependence
on imported oil. The Japanese economy went through brief periods of recessions in the 1980s
and early 2000s. The impact of the latest recession on Japan is particularly severe because
11Claessens et al. (2009) and Claessens et al. (2010) examine the main features of recessions and recoveries
in advanced countries.
12The NBER reference business cycle dates: Troughs: Feb. 1961, November 1970, March 1975, July
1980, November 1982, March 1991, and November 2001. Peaks: April 1960, December 1969, November
1973, January 1980, July 1981, July 1990, March 2001, and December 2007. For these dates, see the NBER
web page.
13As Aruoba and Diebold (2010) also demonstrate, the signicant aspect of the 2008-2009 recession for
the U.S. was its combined severity { its length and depth { relative to the other recessions. Using this metric,
it is by far the worst recession for the U.S. in our sample.
14of the adverse eects of the synchronized collapse of global trade on export industries in
Japan (see Sommer (2009)). For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss the details for each
country, but it is obvious that the factors we estimate are consistent with the evolutions of
national cycles.
The country factors also provide evidence that the 2008-09 recession is the longest and
deepest in Germany, Italy, the U.K, and Japan. In the case of France, however, the 2008-
09 recession is as deep as the 1974-75 recession, although the former one is twice as long.
Lastly in Canada, the country factor suggests that the 1981-83 recession is the worst one
over the past 40 years, however, the 2008-09 is the longest one. To emphasize the depth of
the 2008-2009 recession, Table 4 reports the months with the lowest values for each country's
factor. 35 out of 70 entries belong to the 2008-2009 period, which are denoted with boldface.
The second period which is signicant across all countries is the 1974-1975 recession with 20
entries, denoted in italics. In addition, the country factors are able to capture the dynamics
of the ongoing recoveries. The factors suggest that the recovery started in early 2009, with
the U.S. leading the rebound. By the end of 2009, Canada, Japan and the U.S. already
registered positive levels of activity while the European countries still experienced relatively
weaker recoveries.
The evolution of the volatility of country factors has declined over time, especially from
the mid-1980s until the global nancial crisis of the 2008-2009. In particular, the average
volatility has declined by half from the 1970s to the period 2000-07. This suggests that
our country factors clearly capture the Great Moderation phenomenon, characterized by
the large decline in macroeconomic volatility, widely documented in the literature (see, for
instance, Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003)). Although there is
still a debate about the underlying causes of the decline in volatility, the Great Recession
has changed the nature of this debate as it probably marked an end to the era of the Great
Moderation. Inclusion of the years 2008 and 2009 into the sample leads to higher volatility
in the 2000s than those in the 1980s and 1990s (but still smaller than that in the 1970s),
thus interrupting the downward trend in volatility associated with the Great Moderation.
(not reported)
4.2.3 Synchronization of Country Factors
We next examine the extent of synchronization of business cycles using cross-country corre-
lations of factors. The top left panel of Table 5 reports the correlations for the full sample.
These correlations vary substantially across countries as they range between a low of 0.25
15(Italy and the U.K.) and a high of 0.64 (France-Germany). The neighboring country-pairs,
with stronger trade and nancial linkages, exhibit relatively higher correlations: The country
factors of Canada and the U.S. in North America and those of France, Germany, and Italy
in Europe, for example, feature the highest correlations. In addition, the degree of synchro-
nization between the country factors of Germany and Japan is quite high (0.59) probably
because of the relatively high export dependence of these countries making them sensitive
to global economic developments.
We also compare cross-country correlations of factors with those of underlying indicators,
including output, income, and industrial production (not reported). This is a useful exercise
considering that most of the literature on the synchronization of business cycles does not
go beyond the usual aggregates, such as GDP and IP. Our larger set of activity indicators
provides a broader perspective about the extent of business cycle synchronization. The
exercise yields a number of interesting observations. First, cross-country correlations of
indicators tend to be lower than those of factors. This is an intuitively appealing result since
factors are representations of common uctuations across the underlying indicators.
Second, there are some qualitative similarities as well as dierences between correlations
of factors and those of the underlying indicators. In the case of output, for example, the
country-pair with the lowest correlation is the same as that of factor-pair. However, the
country pair with the highest output correlation is the pair of France-Italy while the France-
Germany pair, which has the highest in the case of factors, is not even in the top three.
Similar observations extend to the comparisons of cross-country correlations of income and
industrial production with those of factors. These ndings suggest that the use of factors
brings out information about the extent of synchronization of business cycles that is not
available by the analysis of correlations of indicators.
How does the extent of synchronization of country factors change over time? As we
summarize in section II, this question is at the heart of the literature analyzing the linkages
between globalization and synchronization of national business cycles. Since our country
factors provide aggregate measures of national business cycles, it is useful to examine the
evolution of business cycle synchronization using them. In the remaining panels of Table
5, we report pairwise correlations for each decade in our sample. Our simple measure of
synchronization is the average of cross-country correlations in each decade.
By this metric, there has been a gradual decline in the degree of synchronization from the
1970s to the 1990s. However, this observation does not necessarily indicate a negative link
between globalization and synchronization since the extent of synchronization also depends
16on the commonality of shocks. For example, the high degree of synchronization in the 1970s
(relative to the 1990s), probably reects the impact of oil price shocks of the era. In the
1980s, the average correlation is similar to that of the 1970s. The common shocks associated
with the tight monetary policies adopted by a number of the G-7 countries in the early 1980s
probably play a role on the cross-country correlations during that decade.
The decade with the lowest average correlation is the 1990s. However, this largely reects
Japan's "Lost Decade" and the slow growth in Germany after the unication. It is likely
that these country-specic developments lead to relatively low correlations of these countries'
factors with others. For example, when we exclude Japan, the average correlation in the
1990s rises to 0.32, and when we exclude both Japan and Germany, the average goes up to
0.43.
The degree of synchronization increases to its highest level, roughly 0.74, in the 2000s.
However, this increase is mostly due to the 2008-09 global nancial crisis. One of the striking
aspects of the crisis is the unusually high degree of synchronization of associated recessions
(and recoveries). When the last two years of the sample are taken out, the average correlation
of the 2000s falls to 0.35, which is still twice as large than the average observed in the 1990s.
To emphasize the synchronicity around large recessions, Figure 15 zooms in the three-
year periods around 1974 and 2008. Taking the oil embargo that started in October 1973 as
the starting point, the top panel of the gure shows that there was signicant divergence in
the countries' experiences during this period. The U.K. is already deep in a recession while
France and Canada are still expanding. By the end of 1974, when the U.S. experiences the
worst point of the recession, this divergence continues, evidenced by the large range of the
factors { between -1 for Japan and the U.K. and -5 for the U.S.. In great contrast, by the
beginning of 2007, all countries have converged in a very narrow band and in the worst point
of the Great Recession, all countries are in a recession. Excluding Germany and Japan,
which are the two export-dependent countries that are by far the worst-aected countries,
the factors are very close to each other both in terms of magnitudes and coherence.
These ndings indicate that it is dicult to reach a conclusive result about the links
between globalization and the synchronization of business cycles. On the one hand, there
is a pick up in the degree of synchronization during the last decade (with or without crisis)
suggesting a positive link. On the other hand, the average correlation in the 2000s (after the
crisis years are eliminated) is only slightly higher than that of the 1970s suggesting that the
extent of synchronization has not changed much even though there has been a substantial
increase in global trade and nancial linkages. These observations are consistent with the
17ndings reported in some of the earlier studies summarized in section 2.
5 Multi-Country Analysis
Country factors do not likely evolve in isolation. Hence, just as we obtain useful country
models by allowing country indicators to depend on country factors, way may similarly want
to allow country factors to depend on a global (in this case, G-7) factor. We now proceed to do
so.14 Our methodology allows us to present a coherent analysis of interactions between the
global business cycle and country-specic cycles, as it employs a well-dened hierarchical
structure. As with our earlier single-country analysis, we rst sketch our multi-country
dynamic factor framework, and then we present a variety of empirical results.
5.1 A Hierarchical Multi-Country Model
Having extracted country-specic factors, we now turn to decomposing these factors into a
common factor across the G-7 countries and idiosyncratic components. Since all country-
specic factors are monthly, the extraction of the common factor will be a straightforward
application of the approach in Stock and Watson (1989). In particular, for country j, the








where ft is the common G-7 factor which has the transition equation
ft = !1ft 1 + !2ft 2 + !3ft 3 + t (8)
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As is standard, we assume that t and 
j
t are uncorrelated among each other and iid over
time.15
14Although we do not pursue the possibility here due to the relatively small size and coherent nature of
the G-7 countries, with larger sets of countries one might want to allow for the possibility of an intermediate
layer of regional factors (e.g., Europe, Asia, Mideast, ...) such that country factors depend on regional
factors, which depend on global factors.
15In order to satisfy identication in the factor model, we normalize the variance of  such that ft has a
unit variance. This requires a non-linear restriction in !1, !2, !3 and the variance of .
185.2 Multi-Country Empirics and Extraction of G-7 Real Activity
In this section, we rst present our estimation results with respect to the G-7 factor and ex-
plain how it relates to the underlying country factors. Then we briey describe the temporal
evolution of the G-7 factor.
A number of interesting results emerge: First, the G-7 factor picks up a substantial
amount of co-movement across countries. Second, the estimation of the factor with various
activity indicators denitely enhances its ability to capture common macroeconomic uctu-
ations in G-7 economies. Third, the G-7 factor displays some of the major global economic
events of the past 40 years. In particular, the factor indicates that the global recession of
2008-2009 is more severe and longer lasting than the mid-1970s recession, making it the
deepest global recession of the past forty years. Fourth, the G-7 and country-specic fac-
tors play dierent roles at dierent points in time in shaping economic activity in dierent
countries.
5.2.1 Estimation of the G-7 Factor
The estimation results of the G-7 factor are reported in Table 6. The factor loadings,
reported in the rst column, show that all country factors load positively and signicantly
on the G-7 factor. Based on the factor loadings, Germany, France and Italy play relatively
more important roles in driving the G-7 factor.16
We then analyze the extent of co-movement between G-7 factor and the country factors.
The second column of the table shows that the average correlation between the G-7 factor
and country factors is around 0.7 suggesting a reasonably high degree of co-movement.
Across countries, however, there are variations in correlations. Canada, Germany and the
U.S. feature the highest correlations (around 0.7) while Italy has the lowest one (0.53). All
countries display higher correlations of country factor with the G-7 factor than with the
country factors of any of the other countries.17 These ndings suggest that the G-7 factor
picks up a substantial amount of comovement across countries.
The extent of co-movement between the G-7 factor and country factors has varied sig-
nicantly over time. While periods of low correlations reect the dominant role played by
country specic developments, periods of high correlations coincide with the common shocks.
16The roots of the autoregressive process in the transition equation are 0:96 and 0:91  0:32i.
17In addition, we nd that the correlation between output and G-7 factor of a country is greater than
that of other countries' output in all cases except the pairs of Germany-France and Germany-the U.K. (19
out of 21 pair-wise correlations).
19For instance, the correlation between the G-7 factor and the country factor of Japan is -0.14
(not reported) during the 1990s reecting the country-specic nature of Japan's lost decade.
In the 2000s, the correlation between the two factors is 0.87 because of the synchronized
recessions of the early 2000s and 2008-2009.
In order to further examine the links between the (ltered) G-7 factor and the underlying
country factors, we regress the G-7 factor on current and 12 lags of each country factors.
We report the coecient on the contemporaneous country factors and the sum of the coef-
cients for each variable to derive its total eect in the last two columns of Table 6. The
country factors for Canada and Germany, followed by Japan and France have the largest
contemporaneous eect. However, in terms of total eects the United States dominates the
other countries, followed by Germany and the United Kingdom. France and Japan have very
small inuence in terms of the total eect.
The G-7 factor features a high level of persistence, as evidenced from the roots of the
characteristic polynomials. The results indicate that the G-7 factor is slightly more persistent
than the country factors.18 This suggests that the G-7 factor is able to capture low frequency
(more persistent) comovement across countries. There is also evidence that the volatility of
the G-7 factor has fallen over time up until the 2008-2009 recession. This is consistent with
the evolution of the volatility of country factors we analyzed in the previous section.
5.2.2 Evolution of the G-7 Factor and the Idiosyncratic Components
The G-7 factor extracted from the country factors is shown in Figure 16. It is able to capture
some of the major economic events of the past 40 years. In particular, the behavior of the
G-7 factor is consistent with the recession of the mid-1970s (associated with the rst oil
price shock), the recession of the early 1980s (associated with the tight monetary policies of
major industrialized nations), the expansionary period of the late 80s, the recession of the
early 1990s, the expansionary period of the late 1990s, the downturn of 2001, and the global
recession of 2008-2009, and the subsequent recovery. The depth and highly synchronized
nature of the mid-1970s and the latest recession episode is striking. However, the G-7 factor
shows that the latest episode is much more severe and longer lasting than the mid-1970s
recession, making it the deepest global recession of the past forty years.19 Indeed, according
18This result is similar to those reported by Gregory et al. (1997); and Kose et al. (2003a).
19The major recession dates identied by the G-7 factor are consistent with the dates of the global
recessions documented by Kose et al. (2009) and Kose et al. (2010). Using a sample of more than 190
countries, they also conclude that the 2009 recession is the deepest and most synchronized global recession
episode of the post-war era. Imbs (2009), using monthly data on industrial production to study the evolution
20to our results, the latest episode resulted in a decline in economic activity by 1.8 times larger
and lasted twice as long as the mid-1970s recession.
The lower panels of Figure 8-14 show the decomposition of each country factor (shown in
the upper panel) in to a part that is due to the G-7 factor and an idiosyncratic part. Using
the notation (7), the former is jft and the latter is 
j
t, for a country j. We have already
reported that the extent of co-movement between the G-7 factor and county factors is quite
high, but it does vary over time. This simply reects that while the G-7 factor is tightly
related to the country factors, there are periods where they move in dierent directions due
to country-specic (idiosyncratic) developments. For example, in the case of Japan, the
idiosyncratic factor conrms that the \Lost Decade" is clearly specic to Japan (Figure 12).
The idiosyncratic factor also displays that the amplitude of the mid-1970s recession in Japan
is larger because of Japan-specic reasons, i.e., its heavy reliance on imported oil. Although
the G-7 factor reects the synchronized nature of the 2008-2009 recession, the sharp drop
in the idiosyncratic factor suggests that there are country-specic forces making the Japan's
recession deeper during this period.
In the case of Canada, the G-7 factor contributes to the severity of the mid-1970s re-
cession while the idiosyncratic factor plays a mitigating role (Figure 8). In contrast, the
idiosyncratic factor aggravates the impact of the early 1980s and early 1990s recessions in
Canada suggesting that country-specic developments play a substantial role during those
episodes. The severe recession of 2008-2009 is mostly driven by the G-7 factor while the
idiosyncratic factor plays a mitigating role in Canada.
These results suggest that the G-7 and country-specic factors play dierent roles at
dierent points in time in dierent countries. In some periods, the country factor is more
strongly reective of domestic activity, while in others the domestic activity reects the
movements in the G-7 factor.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we hope to have cast new light on the global business cycle and its evolution,
working in the tradition of Gregory et al. (1997) and Kose et al. (2003a), among others.
Those authors, however, use only a few low-frequency quarterly indicators from the national
income and product accounts. In contrast, we use more indicators when possible (and higher-
of business cycle correlations since the 1980s, concludes that the degree of cross-country business cycle
correlations during the latest crisis is the highest in three decades.
21frequency, monthly). We do so because lurking in the background is our hope to push toward
real-time monitoring of global macroeconomic activity, which we have not emphasized thus
far but now wish to highlight.
The past quarter-century has witnessed not only progress toward globalization, but also
unprecedented progress in information technology (collection, transmission, processing, stor-
age, etc.), and one wants to monitor the global business cycle in ways that exploit the IT
revolution. In part we are doing so already, exploiting, for example, newly-available monthly
data. But more could be done using IT advances in global real-time monitoring, building for
example on the single-country \nowcasting" framework of Aruoba et al. (2009) and Aruoba
and Diebold (2010).20 We look forward pursuing this in future work, which we hope will
ultimately help guide global real-time policy formulation, implementation and analysis in
global environments, in the spirit of the inaugural Feldstein Lecture to the NBER given by
Taylor (2009).
20Note that in such an environment, updates of assessed global activity will occur much more often
than monthly, even if monthly is the highest-frequency data used, as dierent indicators (and revisions) are
released at dierent times for dierent indicators and countries.
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26Table 1: G-7 Real Activity Indicators
U.S. Series Source Range
Payroll Employment Bureau of Haver (LANAGRA@USECON) 1970M1-2009M12
Gross Domestic Product Haver (GDPH@USNA) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Household Disposable Income Datastream (USOCFRDID) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Initial Unemp. Claims Haver (LICM@USECON) 1970M1-2009M12
Industrial Prodn. Index FRED (INDPRO) 1970M1-2009M12
Total Retail Trade Index OECD (111.SLRTTO01.IXOBSA) 1970M1-2009M12
Canada Series Source Range
Civilian Emp., All Persons OECD (156.EMESCVTT.STSA) 1970M1-2009M12
Gross Domestic Product Haver (S156NGPC@G10) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Household Disposable Income Datastream (CNOCFRDID) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Initial Unemp. Claims Haver (V383900@CANSIM) 1970M1-2009M12
Industrial Prodn. Index Datastream (CNI66..CE) 1970M1-2009M12
Total Retail Trade Index OECD (156.SLRTTO01.IXOBSA) 1970M1-2009M12
U.K. Series Source Range
Total Employment, All Persons OECD (112.EMESCVTT.STSA) 1971M2-2009M11
Gross Domestic Product Haver (ABMIQ@UK) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Household Disposable Income Datastream (UKI66..CE) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Industrial Prodn. Index Datastream (UKI66..CE) 1970M1-2009M12
Total Retail Trade Index OECD (112.SLRTTO01.IXOBSA) 1970M1-2009M12
Japan Series Source Range
Labor Force Survey: Total Emp. Haver (FLED2@JAPAN) 1970M1-2009M12
Gross Domestic Product OECD (158.GDPV) 1970Q1-1979Q4
Haver (REDPC2@JAPAN) 1980Q1-2009Q4
Household Disposable Income Datastream (JPOCFRDID) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Empl. Ins.: Initial Beneciaries Haver (EIIB@JAPAN) 1976M1-2009M12
Industrial Prodn. Index Datastream (JPI66..CE) 1970M1-2009M12
Total Retail Trade Index OECD (158.SLRTTO01.IXOBSA) 1970M1-2009M12
France Series Source Range
Total Employment OECD (132.ET) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Gross Domestic Product Haver (FRSNGDPC@FRANCE) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Gross Household Disp. Income OECD (132.YDRH G) 1970Q1-1977Q4
Datasream (FROCFRDID) 1978Q1-2009Q4
Init. Claims Index, All Persons IMF.stat 1986:M1-2009:M1
Industrial Prodn. Index Datastream (FRI66..CE) 1970M1-2009M12
Germany Series Source Range
Employment Haver (S134ELE@G10) 1981M1-2009M12
Gross Domestic Product GDS (C134NGDP R) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Gross Household Disp. Income Datastream (BDPERDISP) 1970Q1-1990Q4
OECD (134.YDRH G) 1991Q1-2009Q4
Industrial Prodn. Index Datastream (BDI66..CE) 1970M1-2009M12
Italy Series Source Range
Total Employment OECD (136.ET) 1970Q1-2009Q4
Gross Domestic Product OECD (136.GDPV) 1970Q1-1980Q4
Haver (ITSNGDPC@ITALY) 1981Q1-2009Q4
Gross Household Income OECD (136.YDRH G) 1961Q1- 2008Q4
Industrial Prodn. Index Datastream (ITI66..CE) 1970:M1-2009:M12
Note: The table reports the series names, sources (with source-specic mnemonics in parentheses)
and ranges for the variables used.Table 2: G-7 Country Estimation Results
Indicator U.S. Canada U.K. Japan France Germany Italy
EMP 1.86 (*) 1.98 (*)
0.26 (*)
1.15 (*) 0.69 (*) 0.15 (*) 0.47 (*) 0.28 (*)
IP 7.05 (*) 4.57 (*) 5.24 (*) 8.69 (*) 5.42 (*) 7.26 (*) 12.34 (*)
RET 4.18 (*) 2.46 (*) 2.05 (*) 2.95(*) | | 19.96 (*)
INC 0.56 (*) 0.58 (*) 0.68 (*) 0.71 (*) 0.33 (*) 0.49 (*) 0.23
GDP 1.06 (*) 0.92 (*) 1.27 (*) 1.24 (*) 0.83 (*) 1.11 (*) 1.87 (*)
INIT -0.01 (*) -0.11 (*) | 0.00 0.00 | |
1 0.64 (*) 2.27 (*) 0.48 (*) 1.95 (*) 1.54 (*) 1.60 (*) -0.09 (*)
2 -0.05 -1.90 (*) 0.27 (*) -1.57 (*) -1.14 (*) -1.09 (*) 0.27 (*)
3 0.18 (*) 0.60 (*) -0.10 0.56 (*) 0.50 (*) 0.33 (*) 0.45 (*)
1 0.84 0.89 0.66 0.90 0.90 0.74 0.85
2 -0.10 + 0.45i 0.69 + 0.44i -0.49 0.53+0.59i 0.32+0.68i 0.43+0.52i -0.47+0.55i
3 -0.10 - 0.45i 0.69 - 0.44i 0.31 0.53-0.59i 0.32-0.68i 0.43-0.52i -0.47-0.55i
Note: The variable acronyms correspond to the measures of employment, industrial production,
retail sales, income, GDP and initial claims, as dened in Table 1. For the U.K., employment
before and after 1992 appear as two separate variables. In the top panel we show, for each country,
the estimated indicator loadings on the country factor. In the middle panel we show the estimated
transition equation dynamic parameters. In both the top and middle panels, asterisks indicate
statistical signicance at the ve percent level. (*) denotes signicance at 5% level. In the bottom
panel we show the inverted roots, sorted from largest to smallest modulus, corresponding to the
estimated transition equation dynamic parameters.Table 3: Country Factors and Indicators
(a) Correlations Between Smoothed Country Factors and Indicators
Indicator U.S. Canada U.K. Japan France Germany Italy
EMP 0.87 0.60
0.50
0.77 0.20 0.20 0.43 0.09
GDP 0.63 0.82 0.76 0.80 0.89 0.61 0.77
INC 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.47 0.36 0.33 0.33
INIT -0.35 -0.16 - -0.29 -0.07 - -
IP 0.83 0.41 0.43 0.48 0.37 0.43 0.62
RET 0.32 0.16 0.15 0.21 - - 0.57
(b) Weights of Contemporaneous Indicators in the Filtered Country Factors
Indicator U.S. Canada U.K. Japan France Germany Italy
EMP 0.55 0.19 0.43 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.00
IP 0.32 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.32 0.20
RET 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.08 - - 0.23
INIT -0.46 -0.43 - 0.10 -0.05 - -
INC 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.04
GDP 0.21 0.34 0.58 0.53 0.80 0.45 0.62
(c) Cumulative Weights of Indicators in the Filtered Country Factors
Indicator U.S. Canada U.K. Japan France Germany Italy
EMP 0.13 0.49 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.09 0.01
IP 0.56 0.31 0.34 0.24 0.08 0.38 -0.13
RET 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.14 - - -0.22
INIT -0.01 -0.02 - 0.01 -0.01 - -
INC 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00
GDP 0.36 0.55 0.76 0.74 0.87 0.74 0.76
Note: The variable acronyms correspond to the measures of employment, industrial production,
retail sales, income, GDP and initial claims, as dened in Table 1. For the U.K., employment
before and after 1992 appear as two separate variables. In panel (a) we show, for each country, the
contemporaneous correlations between indicators and the smoothed country factors. For panels
(b) and (c), we regress the ltered country factors on current and 12 monthly or 4 quarterly
lags of standardized indicators using only the end-of-quarter observations. Panel (b) reports the
coecient on the contemporaneous indicators and panel (c) reports the sum of the coecients for
each indicator.Table 4: Months with Lowest Observations for Each Country Factor
US UK CAN JAP FRA GER ITA
1974M12 2009M01 1982M05 2008M12 2008M11 2009M01 2009M01
1980M05 2008M11 1982M06 2009M01 1974M11 2008M12 2008M11
1974M11 2009M03 1982M04 2008M11 2008M12 2008M11 1974M10
1975M01 2009M02 1982M07 2009M02 2009M01 2009M02 1974M12
1980M06 1980M02 2009M02 2008M10 1974M12 2008M10 1992M08
2008M12 1973M11 2009M03 1974M02 2008M10 2009M03 2009M02
2008M11 1975M04 1982M03 1974M01 2009M02 1974M12 2008M12
2009M01 1974M02 2009M01 1974M03 1974M10 1974M11 2009M03
1970M10 2008M12 1982M08 2008M09 1975M01 1975M01 2008M10
1975M02 1980M04 1990M12 1998M03 2009M03 1974M10 1975M01
Note: The table reports the month with the lowest observations for each country, in ascending
order. Boldface denotes months in 2008 and 2009 and italics denote the months in 1974 and 1975.Table 5: Evolution of Correlation of Country Factors
Full Sample [Average = 0.44] 1990s [Average = 0.19]
CAN FRA GER ITA JAP UK CAN FRA GER ITA JAP UK
FRA 0.47 0.49
GER 0.42 0.64 -0.07 0.46
ITA 0.37 0.55 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.17
JAP 0.31 0.48 0.59 0.37 -0.42 -0.22 0.32 0.04
UK 0.45 0.40 0.48 0.25 0.37 0.74 0.38 0.04 0.21 -0.28
US 0.60 0.43 0.49 0.29 0.41 0.43 0.77 0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.33 0.57
1970s [Average = 0.37] 2000s [Average = 0.74]
CAN FRA GER ITA JAP UK CAN FRA GER ITA JAP UK
FRA 0.48 0.81
GER 0.42 0.52 0.68 0.84
ITA 0.24 0.51 0.27 0.66 0.70 0.68
JAP 0.16 0.27 0.54 0.12 0.69 0.83 0.84 0.66
UK 0.43 0.33 0.57 0.08 0.52 0.78 0.73 0.67 0.64 0.69
US 0.38 0.44 0.53 0.16 0.46 0.33 0.83 0.83 0.70 0.64 0.80 0.73
1980s [Average = 0.33] 2000s (excl. 08-09) [Average = 0.35]
CAN FRA GER ITA JAP UK CAN FRA GER ITA JAP UK
FRA -0.03 0.59
GER 0.47 0.61 0.25 0.60
ITA 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.32
JAP 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.23 0.48 0.54 0.51 0.31
UK 0.17 0.30 0.45 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.23
US 0.70 0.10 0.51 0.23 0.37 0.29 0.55 0.51 0.21 0.22 0.59 0.20
Note: The table reports the pairwise correlations between the country factors.Table 6: Estimation Results for the G-7 Factor






Canada 0.62 0.76 0.74 0.19
France 0.61 0.71 0.28 0.09
Germany 0.70 0.75 0.51 0.27
Italy 0.41 0.53 0.05 0.14
Japan 0.49 0.60 0.28 0.05
U.K. 0.55 0.63 0.07 0.26
U.S. 0.68 0.74 0.10 0.34
Note: The rst column reports the estimate G-7 factor loadings for each country factor. All
estimates are highly signicant. The second column shows the correlation between the smoothed
G-7 factor and each country factor. For the last two columns, we regress the ltered G-7 factor
on current and 12 monthly lags of standardized country factors. Panel (b) reports the coecient
on the contemporaneous country factors and panel (c) reports the sum of the coecients for each
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70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Retail Sales
Note: All variables except Initial Claims are expressed as annualized monthly or quarterly per-










































70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Industrial Production
Note: All variables except Initial Claims are expressed as annualized monthly or quarterly per-
centage changes. Initial Claims is expressed relative to the total labor force but is in arbitrary
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1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005Appendix
A Details of the State Space Model for Country Factor
Extraction
Consider a generic country with all six indicators observed. Order the indicators as employ-
ment (monthly), industrial production (monthly), retail sales (monthly), income (quarterly),
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(18)
50